I examine how strong corporate governance proxied by the threat of hostile takeovers affects innovation and firm value. I find a significant decline in the number of patents and citations per patent for firms incorporated in states that pass antitakeover laws relative to firms incorporated in states that do not. Most of the impact of antitakeover laws on innovation occurs 2 or more years after they are passed, indicating a causal effect. The negative effect of antitakeover laws is mitigated by the presence of alternative governance mechanisms such as large shareholders, pension fund ownership, leverage, and product market competition.
THERE HAS BEEN A long-standing debate about the role of capital markets in promoting economic growth. While a positive relation has been theoretically argued and cross country empirical evidence has been provided (e.g., Beck, Levine, and Loayaza (2000) , and Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005) ), the exact channel and the direction of causality have been more difficult to establish. Developed capital markets can promote economic growth via at least two channels: by alleviating financial constraints and financing profitable projects that otherwise would not be financed, and by providing the right incentives to managers through their monitoring and disciplining mechanisms. While the role of the first channel is relatively straightforward, the second channel is more controversial. Holmstrom (1989) famously argues that capital markets, by pressuring top managers, force them to focus on short-term projects and neglect innovation. Because innovation is a major driver of economic growth R (Solow (1957) , Romer (1987 Romer ( , 1990 ), the implicit conclusion is that the disciplining feature of capital markets may hinder innovation and in turn growth. In this paper, I evaluate how the threat of hostile takeovers, which is considered one of most extreme examples of external pressure on top management, impacts innovation.
While hostile takeovers are considered one of the strongest corporate governance mechanisms to discipline managers and provide them with incentives to make value-enhancing decisions, 1 numerous academics and policy makers argue that perhaps the greatest public concern about takeovers is that they stifle innovation (see, Shleifer and Vishny (1990) ). Previous research has provided inconclusive evidence partly because of the difficulties in establishing a causal link from hostile takeovers to innovation, in measuring the threat of takeovers, and in the ability to properly capture the creation of valuable innovation. In addition, it has been argued that, even if the threat of hostile takeovers is absent, alternative governance mechanisms will step in and ensure that managers are monitored properly. This paper uses an exogenous variation in state antitakeover laws to evaluate the impact of hostile takeovers on the quantity and quality of innovative output measured by patents and patent citations. It also assesses the importance of alternative governance mechanisms on disciplining managers when the threat of hostile takeovers is absent.
The theoretical literature offers two contrasting predictions to explain how hostile takeovers affect innovation. According to the moral hazard (or agency) view, managers that are not monitored or pressured by shareholders will shirk, waste funds on pet projects, or engage in other types of value-destroying activities. Due to career concerns, managers may also prefer to invest effort and human capital in more routine projects with quicker returns but lower overall value. The threat of hostile takeovers mitigates the moral hazard problem by disciplining managers and keeping them focused on pursuing the most innovative and valuable projects. It also forces them to respond optimally to technological changes by efficiently restructuring the firm, instead of enjoying cosy relationships with employees and the local community (e.g., Jensen and Ruback (1983) , Jensen (1988) ). Seru (2012) demonstrates that moral hazard problems stifle innovation in conglomerates. The moral hazard view predicts that, if the threat of hostile takeovers is reduced, managers will innovate less and create less valuable innovations.
Other streams of research derive the opposite prediction. Specifically, Shleifer and Summers (1988) argue that, when takeover threats are high, incumbent managers have less power vis-a-vis shareholders, and therefore fewer incentives to invest effort and human capital in creating innovative products. Incumbent managers fear a hostile acquirer will dismiss them after the innovation is created, taking advantage of the profits resulting from the innovation without bearing the costs for creating it. This argument is based on the theory of incomplete contracts. Hart and Moore (1990) and Aghion and Tirole (1994) argue that, when contracts are incomplete, the allocation of power between managers and shareholders becomes an important incentive mechanism.
Using a different argument, Stein (1988) arrives at the same prediction. He argues that, because of asymmetric information, shareholders cannot properly evaluate investments in long-term innovative projects, and therefore tend to undervalue the stocks of companies investing in such projects. That in turn would make it easier for hostile acquirers to obtain control of the company by buying the stock on the cheap. To protect current shareholders against such expropriation, managers will invest less money, effort, and human capital in innovative projects that are difficult to understand by the market, and more in routine projects with quicker and more certain returns. As a result, the quantity and quality of innovation declines. Manso (2011) develops a theoretical model to show that greater pressure on innovators and lower tolerance for mistakes can lead to lower creativity and less innovation.
Since the theoretical literature provides contrasting predictions about the impact of hostile takeovers on innovation, it is ultimately an empirical question as to which view is more relevant. To conduct my analysis, I use the enactment of Business Combination antitakeover laws to capture an exogenous decrease in the threat of hostile takeovers, and I use patents and patent citations to measure the quantity and quality of innovation. Using a panel of 13,339 U.S. firms over the 1976 to 2000 period and a difference-in-differences methodology, I find that firms incorporated in states that pass a Business Combination law innovate less after the law is passed than otherwise similar firms incorporated in states that do not pass such a law. I control for firm characteristics such as size, industry concentration, leverage, firm age, profitability, and the presence of tangible assets.
I also control for time-invariant unobservable (e.g., management quality) and observable (e.g., the presence of poison pills) firm characteristics through firm fixed effects, and economy-wide shocks through time fixed effects. To control for the fact that antitakeover laws can affect innovation with a lag, I look at innovation from 1 to 4 years after the enactment of the laws. The results are statistically as well as economically significant. Four years after the enactment of a Business Combination law, the average firm incorporated in a state that passes such a law experiences a 20.94% reduction in the number of citations per patent relative to an otherwise similar firm incorporated in a state that does not pass a Business Combination law. For robustness, instead of the enactment of Business Combination laws, I use the first-time enactment of any of three different types of antitakeover laws-Control Share Acquisition, Business Combination, and Fair Price laws and find similar results.
I argue that antitakeover laws are exogenous to innovation for several reasons. First, they are outside the control of the individual firm, and are enacted in the state of incorporation rather than the state of location, which could be impacted by other economic events at the same time. Second, companies that experience a decrease in innovation that made them vulnerable to a takeover may lobby for these laws. To counter such concerns, Romano (1987) reports that antitakeover laws were almost always exclusively promoted by a specific R company, and were not the outcome of a concerted pressure by a wide coalition of firms. For example, in Connecticut, the antitakeover bill was lobbied for by Aetna. In Arizona, the "Greyhound bill" was heavily promoted by Greyhound executives. In Missouri, an antitakeover bill was promoted by Trans World Airlines, which was battling Carl Icahn. These examples suggest that the enactment of antitakeover laws was an exogenous event for the vast majority of firms. More importantly, none of the examples provided in the literature suggest that the reason for lobbying was an actual or anticipated decline in innovative output.
Following Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) , I conduct an additional test to check for potential endogeneity of the antitakeover laws, and find that they have no impact on innovation 1 or 2 years before their enactment. Most of the change in innovation occurs 2 or more years after the laws are passed. This finding also demonstrates that, since innovation is a long-term process, for the majority of firms it takes 2 or more years for antitakeover laws to affect innovation.
Next, to shed further light on the relation between corporate governance and innovation, I examine whether alternative governance mechanisms can mitigate the negative impact of antitakeover laws. First, I examine the monitoring role of outside shareholders by using two measures suggested in the literature, namely, the presence of large blockholders, and pension funds. Second, I investigate the influence of the threat of bankruptcy and career concerns by looking at financial leverage and product market competition. I hold leverage as well as the presence of large shareholders and pension funds at their 1985 levels to mitigate potential endogeneity concerns. Consistent with the moral hazard view, I find that the negative impact of antitakeover laws on citations per patent 4 years after the law is passed is reduced by 85% for companies that have an outside shareholder that owns more than 5% of equity, by 94% for companies with an activist pension fund, by 42% for companies with financial leverage that is one standard deviation higher than the mean, and by 33% and 44%, respectively for firms in the second and third tercile of industry concentration. However, these alternative governance mechanisms are not perfect substitutes for the threat of hostile takeovers because they mitigate, but do not completely eliminate, the negative impact of antitakeover laws on innovation.
Finally, I investigate the impact of patent citations and antitakeover laws on firm value. I find that one more citation per patent increases the firm's market-to-book ratio 3 years later by 14.2% on average. Combined with the previous finding, this result suggests that antitakeover laws reduce firm value through innovation by 2.97%. As expected, the overall negative impact of the enactment of Business Combination laws on firm value 3 years later is larger (6.5%), because there might be other channels through which they reduce firm value.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I describes the antitakeover laws, the data, and the empirical methodology. Section II establishes the empirical evidence on the link between antitakeover laws and innovation. Section III examines the joint impact of antitakeover laws and alternative governance mechanisms on innovation, and analyses the influence of innovation and antitakeover laws on firm value. Section IV discusses the related literature. Section concludes.
I. Data and Variable Construction
The initial sample of companies examined in this paper includes 147,470 firm-years based on 16,718 firms that have publicly traded stock over the period 1976 to 2000. The main sample includes 101,700 firm-years based on 13,339 firms that have data for all variables described below. I combine innovation data from the NBER patent database assembled by Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001) with financial data from Compustat. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) provide the years in which Business Combination, Fair Price, and Control Share Acquisition laws are enacted. They are shown in Table I . The states of incorporation for each firm come from Compustat and Compact D/SEC databases.
A. The Main Explanatory Variable: Antitakeover Legislation
The legal and academic literature on antitakeover legislation documents that antitakeover laws shifted the power from shareholders to managers and thus decreased shareholder monitoring (e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) ). Antitakeover legislation was first introduced in 1968 with the Williams Act, a federal statute aimed at improving disclosure, restricting fraud, and protecting target shareholders during the tender offer process. States further regulated takeovers by adopting stricter measures during the 1970s. These "first generation" antitakeover laws were pronounced unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 1982 because their jurisdiction extended beyond the companies incorporated in the legislating state. Following that decision, in the 1980s states gradually adopted "second generation" laws that remedied some of the objections raised by the Supreme Court, most importantly, restricting the reach of the laws to companies incorporated in the legislating state. In 1987 these statutes were deemed constitutional by the Supreme Court, inducing even more states to adopt similar laws.
One of the most restrictive types of antitakeover laws are Business Combination laws. These laws impose a 3 to 5 year moratorium on certain types of transactions, such as mergers, divestitures, consolidations, share exchanges, leases, transfers, liquidations, dissolutions, and asset sales between the firm and a large shareholder that obtains more than a specified percentage of the shares unless the board of directors votes otherwise before the threshold is reached. Academics and practitioners alike argue that, among different types of antitakeover laws, Business Combination laws increase managerial entrenchment the most. Mullainathan (2001, 2003) find that the enactment of Business Combination laws leads to a significant increase in CEO and employee pay, while the impact of other (non-Business Combination) laws is insignificant. Karpoff and Malatesta (1989) show that, compared to the other R Table I State Antitakeover Legislation This table reports the year in which second-and third-generation antitakeover laws known as Business Combination (BC), Fair Price (FP), and Control Share Acquisition (CSA) laws, were passed in different states. Business Combination laws impose a moratorium (3 to 5 years) on specified transactions between the target and the acquirer holding a specified threshold percentage of stock unless the board votes otherwise before the acquiring person becomes an interested shareholder. Fair Price laws require shareholders acquiring a percentage of stocks beyond a threshold level to pay a "fair price" for all stocks acquired, while Control Share Acquisition laws give the right to noninterested shareholders to decide whether a large shareholder has any voting right. Source: Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003 --1985  Idaho  1988  1988  1988  Illinois  1989  1984  -Indiana  1986  1986  1986  Kansas  1989  1989  1988  Kentucky  1987  1989  -Louisiana  -1985  1987  Maine  1988  --Maryland  1989  1983  1988  Massachusetts  1989  -1987  Michigan  1989  1985  1988  Minnesota  1987  -1984  Mississippi  -1985  1991  Missouri  1986  1986  1984  Nebraska  1988  -1988  Nevada  1991  -1987  New Jersey  1986  1986  -New York  1985  1985  -North Carolina  -1987  1987  Ohio  1990  1990  -Oklahoma  1991  -1987  Oregon  --1987  Pennsylvania  1989  1989  1989  Rhode Island  1990  --South Carolina  1988  1988  1988  South Dakota  1990  1990  1990  Tennessee  1988  1988  1988  Utah  --1987  Virginia  1988  1985  1988  Washington -Wisconsin 1987 1985 1991 Wyoming 1989 types of antitakeover laws, the enactment of Business Combination laws is followed by the greatest stock price decline for companies incorporated in the legislating states. This paper therefore mainly focuses on the impact of Business Combination laws on innovation.
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Plenty of anecdotal legal evidence also suggests that Business Combination laws increased the power of management at the expense of shareholders. As Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) report, in the Acquisition Corp. versus Universal Food Corp. case the court ruled that, although the law violated management-shareholder neutrality by favoring management, this violation was not a reason for overturning the law. By increasing the cost to the acquiring shareholder, Business Combination laws weaken corporate governance and increase managerial entrenchment.
For robustness I also use two other types of antitakeover laws, namely, Fair Price and Control Share Acquisition laws. Fair Price laws require shareholders acquiring a percentage of stocks beyond a threshold level to pay to all shareholders the highest price paid to any during a specified period of time before the start of a tender offer. In that way, Fair Price laws reduce the pressure on target's shareholders to tender their shares, and therefore make the acquisition more expensive. Control Share Acquisition laws give noninterested shareholders the right to decide whether a newly qualified large shareholder has any voting right. In that way, they make it harder for a hostile acquirer to gain control of the firm and fire underperforming management. Table I lists the states and years in which the three types of antitakeover laws were enacted.
The key explanatory variable in my analysis is the indicator variable BC st , which takes a value of one if at time t state s has enacted a Business Combination law, and zero otherwise. For robustness, I use the variable First antitakeover, FA st , which takes a value of one if at time t state s has enacted any of the three types of antitakeover laws (Business Combination, Fair Price, or Control Share Acquisition), and zero otherwise.
B. Construction of the Dependent Variable
Previous studies of the effects of takeover threats on innovation predominantly use R&D expenditures to measure innovation. Although a reasonable proxy, R&D expenditures are an input to innovation along with physical and human capital, managerial and employee effort, and creativity. High R&D expenditures are less likely to result in successful innovation when other inputs are not effectively employed. Moreover, managers may substitute R&D expenditures for other inputs by spending an excessive amount, which, rather than helping, may hurt innovation. Furthermore, R&D expenditures cannot be used to create a measure of innovation quality. Therefore, an output measure of successful innovation is a less noisy measure of managerial performance, and is R preferred in this paper. Nevertheless, for robustness in the Internet Appendix, 3 I use R&D expenditures and find qualitatively similar results.
In this paper, I use two types of metrics to measure a firm's innovative output. The first, Patent, is a simple patent count for each firm-year. The relevant year is the application year, which is very close to the actual innovation and far before the innovation is transformed into a finished product ready for the market (Hall, Jaffee, and Trajtenberg (2001) ). I construct Patent as the number of patents for each firm-year divided by the mean number of patents for the same year. This weighting adjustment corrects for the truncation bias in patent grants, which results from the fact that patents have on average a 2-year lag from the time a patent application is submitted until the time it is granted, and therefore some patents that have already been applied for may not yet appear in the sample. 4 The second metric, citations per patent, assesses the significance of a firm's innovative output. This measure is motivated by the recognition that a simple count of patents does not distinguish breakthrough innovations from less significant, or incremental, technological discoveries. Pakes and Shankerman (1984) show that the distribution of the value of patents is extremely skewed, with most of the value concentrated in a small number of very important and highly cited patents. Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2005) , among others, demonstrate that patent citations are an accurate measure of the value of innovations. I provide additional evidence of the link between citations per patent and firm value in Section III.F of this paper. Intuitively, the rationale behind using patent citations to identify important innovations is that, if firms are willing to further invest in a project that is building on a previous patent, they have to cite that patent. This implies that the patent that is cited is technologically influential and economically significant.
Patent citations, however, also suffer from truncation bias because patent citations are received for many years after the patent is granted. For example, a patent that was created in 1984 will have much more time to receive citations than a patent created in 1999 because the sample of patent citations that I use in the paper ends in 2002. Another potential concern is that different industries might have different propensities to cite patents. I correct for these biases by using two methods suggested by Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001) , the fixed effects method and the quasi-structural method. The fixed effects method corrects for these biases by dividing the number of patent citations by the average amount of patent citations in the same cohort (year, technology class, or year-and-technology class) in which the patent belongs.
5 The quasi-structural method multiplies each patent citation by an index created by econometrically estimating the distribution of the citation lag (the time from the application of the patent until a citation is received).
I As Griliches (1990) indicates, patents have been widely used in empirical studies to measure innovative output. Although patents are preferred to R&D expenditures, they also have their drawbacks. Not all firms and industries patent their innovations, because in some cases inventions do not meet the patentability criteria, and in other cases because the inventor relies on secrecy or other means to protect her innovation. (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2005) ). The variables that measure innovation are constructed from the NBER patent data set, which includes annual information on patent assignee names, the number of patents, the number of citations received by each patent, the technology class of the patent, the year in which the patent application is filed, and the year it is granted. Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001) match the assignees of the patents in the NBER data set by name to manufacturing firms from Compustat, as of 1989. The fact that the matching occurs for firms that existed in or before 1989 might introduce survivorship bias, with older firms dominating the latter half of my sample. I control for this bias in the Internet Appendix, and conclude that it does not affect my results.
As Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001) indicate, the match is not perfect because assignees obtain patents under a variety of names and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office does not keep a unique identifier for each patenting organization from year to year. Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg perform a cumbersome procedure to account for these idiosyncrasies, with the matched firms in the patent data set identified by six-digit CUSIP number if the assignee is a public corporation or is a subsidiary of a public corporation covered in the 6 To help better understand the citations per patent measure, suppose that a firm has applied for five patents in 1986; each of them generated 1, 3, 5, 6, and 10 citations, respectively from 1986 to 2002. The raw number of citations per patent for that firm in 1986 is (1 + 3 + 5 + 6 + 10)/5 = 5. That number is additionally divided by the mean number of citations per patent for that cohort (year or year-and-technology class) to correct for truncation bias, which gives the final measure of citations per patent.
7 In my analysis I control for industry specific trends by using industry or firm fixed effects. Furthermore, in the Internet Appendix I examine a subsample of firms operating in industries in which patenting is important (citations per patent above the mean) and find even stronger results. R Compustat Industrial Annual database. Using these CUSIP numbers, I merge the financial data in Compustat with the NBER patent data set.
I augment the sample of firms with patents by including all the firms in Compustat that operate in the same four-digit SIC industries as the firms in the patent database but do not have patents. I take the patent and citations per patent count to be zero for these firms. Including these firms alleviates sample selection concerns, since the sampling procedure is independent of whether the firms patent or not. A drawback of this approach may be that for some firms or industries patenting might not be an accurate measure of innovation, or some industries might not be innovative at all. However, including firm or industry fixed effects in all regression models largely eliminates this concern. In addition, in the robustness section (see the Internet Appendix) I conduct my analysis only on firms from innovative industries, and find even stronger results. Finally, I exclude industries such as financial services and utilities that operate under different regulatory rules from manufacturing firms.
C. Other Explanatory Variables
The data on total assets, sales, industry SIC, R&D expenditures, book equity, book debt, net PPE, operating income, firm age, and market-to-book (Q) come from Compustat. In the empirical specification, I follow Hall and Ziedonis (2001) among others, and include (Log(Sales)) to control for firm size. Following Aghion et al. (2005) , I control for industry concentration using the Herfindahl index (HI) constructed at the four-digit SIC level. I also use the squared Herfindahl index to control for nonlinear effects of industry concentration. I construct the firm age, Age, that measures the age of the firm as the number of years since the IPO as reported in CRSP. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to remove the influence of extreme outliers.
D. Model Specification
I follow Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) and use a difference-indifferences methodology. Specifically, I estimate the following model:
where i indexes firms, s indexes the state of incorporation, k indexes the state of location, t indexes time, y isk(t+n) is the dependent variable, which is log(1 + Patent) or log(1 + Citations/Patent T ime ), and n is the number of years after the current time period t, and is equal to three or four. The variable BC st is a dummy equal to one if an antitakeover law has been enacted by time t in state s, and X iskt is a vector of control variables described in Section I.C above. I control for time-invariant unobservable firm characteristics by using firm fixed effects, β i . Year indicator variables α t control for economy-wide shocks.
It is helpful to consider an example. Suppose I want to estimate the effect of the Business Combination law passed in Massachusetts in 1989 on innovation. I can subtract the number of innovations before the law from the number of innovations after the law is passed for firms incorporated in Massachusetts. However, economy-wide shocks may occur at the same time and affect the number of innovations in 1989. To control for such factors, I calculate the same difference in a control state (e.g., California) that does not pass a Business Combination law in 1989. Finally, I calculate the difference between these two differences, which represents the incremental effect of the enactment of the law on firms incorporated in the treatment state of Massachusetts compared to firms incorporated in the control state of California.
The tests used in this paper are even more stringent than the simple intuition provided above, since they control not only for state-wide differences but also for other firm-specific unobservable differences by using firm fixed effects. Another advantage is that different states pass the laws at different times, which allows a given state to be both a treatment (if it has already passed a law) and a control (if it has not yet passed a law). Furthermore, the state of location and the state of incorporation often differ, which helps mitigate concerns that a change in economic conditions, legislation, or regulatory practices in the state of location might be an omitted factor driving both the enactment of the law and the change in innovation.
Consistent with existing studies (e.g., Kortum and Lerner (2000)), I use a log-linear model, since the dependent variable is a count variable. The loglinear model is preferred to a Poisson model in my main analysis because the Poisson model is a nonlinear model and, when it is estimated with fixed effects, the maximum likelihood algorithm omits all firms that do not change their innovations throughout the sample period (see Chamberlain (1980) for more details). Because those firms might carry valuable information, excluding them from the analysis might weaken the power of the tests and introduce noise in the estimation procedure.
For some empirical tests, instead of firm fixed effects, I use industry and state fixed effects that control for any industry and state-wide differences in R&D and innovative intensity (Kortum and Lerner (2000) , Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2005) ). To construct industry dummies, I classify industries at the four-digit SIC level. To control for serial correlation, I cluster the standard errors at the firm level, as suggested by Petersen (2009) . For robustness, I also cluster the standard errors at the state of location level, or allow for correlated error terms at the state of incorporation level, as suggested by Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) .
II. Antitakeover Legislation and Technological Innovation: Main Results

A. Descriptive Statistics
Panel A of 
Summary Statistics
This table reports summary statistics for the key variables used in the analysis. Patent information comes from the NBER patent data set provided by Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001) . This data set includes the number of patents by each firm and the number of citations received by each patent. I select all public firms from the NBER patent file that have financial data available in S&P's Compustat database. I also include all the firms in Compustat that operate in the same industries as the firms in the patent database but don't have patents. Data on Sales, R&D expenditures, Profitability, Tangibility, Leverage, Age, the Herfindahl index, and the Market-to-Book ratio come from Compustat and CRSP. I exclude firms from the financial sector and utilities. Panel A presents information about firm-years for firms with (columns (4) to (6)) and without (columns (1) to (3)) at least one patent. Panel B presents information for firm-years with at least one patent. Firms are divided into two subsamples: firms with below (columns (1) to (3)) or above (columns (4) to (6)) the median citations per patent (Citations/Patent T ime ). Panel C presents information for firm-years for which BC = 0 (columns (1) to (3)) or BC = 1 (columns (4) to (6)), where BC is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if there is a Business Combination law passed in the state of incorporation of a given firm in that year, and zero otherwise. All differences (except Tangibility in Panels A and B, the Herfindahl Index in Panel B, and Leverage in Panel C) between column (1) and column (4) T ime is 0.10 vs. 0.14). These results highlight the need for conducting multivariate analysis, and properly measuring the significance of innovation in terms of citations per patent. Without properly controlling for time fixed effects as well as observable and unobservable firm characteristics, it is difficult to infer a causal relationship. Table II 
B. Multivariate Analysis
In Table III T ime , are measured 3 years (t + 3) and 4 years later (t + 4). Intuitively, I proceed in this way because antitakeover laws might affect innovation with a lag. 8 The coefficients of interest in both tables are on BC st (columns (1), (2), (4), and (5)) or FA st (columns (3) and (6)). All regressions include time and firm fixed effects. I control for serial correlation by clustering the standard errors at the firm level as suggested by Petersen (2009) .
Columns (1) and (2) of Table III show that the number of patents for the average firm decreases after a Business Combination law is passed: by 11.23% 3 years later, and by 14.41% 4 years later, respectively. Columns (4) and (5) show that the number of citations per patent for the average firm also drops substantially after a Business Combination law is enacted. It decreases by 16.43% 3 years later, and by 20.94% 4 years later. Column (3) shows that the number of patents declines by 12.03%, and column (6) shows that the number of citations per patent declines by 19.14% 4 years after the first of the three types of antitakeover laws (Fair Price, Control Share Acquisition, or Business Combination) is enacted. These results provide strong evidence that the moral hazard view is more relevant to explain managerial behavior than the contracting and asymmetric information views. (4) to (6)) on an indicator variable BC (columns (1), (2), (4), and (5)), which takes a value of one if a Business Combination law is passed, and zero otherwise, or FA (columns (3) and (6) The coefficients on the other control variables used in Table III are largely consistent with previous findings in the literature. Larger firms have more patents and more citations per patent. Industry concentration has no significant impact on innovation, once firm fixed effects are included. Firm age is negatively related to innovation, implying that younger firms tend to innovate more. Since leverage might be an endogenous explanatory variable, I use the mean industry leverage, which is a sticky variable that is harder to be manipulated endogenously by the firm. I find that mean industry leverage is negatively related to the number of patents, and largely unrelated to the number of R citations per patent. Intuitively, shareholders are more tolerant of innovative and risky projects, and thus less likely to shut them down than creditors. It is also possible that leverage reduces managerial flexibility (Graham and Harvey (2001) ), and thus leads to lower tolerance for experimentation, creativity, and innovation. Profitability (
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) is negatively related to the number of patents, and unrelated to the number of citations per patent, while firms with more tangible assets have more citations per patent.
C. Additional Endogeneity Tests
As discussed earlier, although the enactment of antitakeover laws represents an exogenous event for most of the firms in the sample, following Mullainathan (2001, 2003) I conduct an additional test to further alleviate potential endogeneity concerns. For example, the results may be subject to reverse causality if firms that notice a decline in the number of innovations respond either by changing the state of incorporation or by lobbying for the enactment of antitakeover laws to prevent being taken over. If this were the case, there would be a trend of declining innovation even before the laws were enacted. To check for preexisting trends in innovation I estimate the following equation:
where Before
is a dummy variable equal to one if it is 1 or 2 years (t − 1 or t − 2) before an antitakeover law is passed (at time t in state s), that is, the state will pass the law in 1 or 2 years, Current 0 st is a dummy variable equal to one if it is the year (t) when the antitakeover law is passed in state s, After 1 st is a dummy variable equal to one if it is 1 year after an antitakeover law is passed in state s, and After 2+ st is equal to one if it is 2 or more years after an antitakeover law is passed in state s. The coefficient on the dummy variable Before −2or−1 st is especially important because its significance and magnitude indicate if there is any relation between innovation and antitakeover laws before those laws were enacted. A negative coefficient would indicate that the decline in innovation preceded the law. To create these four explanatory variables I use Business Combination laws in columns (1), (2), (4), and (5) of Table IV , and the first of the three types of antitakeover laws in columns (3) and (6).
The results presented in Table IV suggest that on average there was no trend of declining innovation before the antitakeover laws were enacted. The coefficient on Before −2or−1 st is small and statistically insignificant for both the number of patents (columns (1) to (3)) and the number of citations per patent (columns (4) to (6)). The coefficient on Current 0 st is also small and insignificant for the number of patents, and negative and significant but very small for the number of citations per patent. The coefficients on After Quasi , which employs a quasi-structural model to estimate the citations lag. The main results are robust to these alternative measures of innovation. Further, although patents and patent citations are a superior measure of innovation, I also use R&D expenditures as my dependent variable and find that it is also negatively related to the enactment of Business Combination laws, again supporting the moral hazard view.
Second, although most of the impact of antitakeover laws on patenting activity occurs 2 or more years into the future as shown in Table IV , sometimes the laws may influence innovation faster, especially if they have been anticipated. I therefore present the impact of antitakeover laws on innovation from 1 to 4 years into the future.
Third, to further control for endogeneity, I remove the companies that opted out of the antitakeover laws since 1990 using the corporate governance data set provided by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) . The results remain unaffected by the removal of these companies.
Fourth, I test for the possibility that the moral hazard view is relevant for the whole sample of firms, but not for a subsample of very innovative firms for which the pressure from hostile takeovers can be counterproductive. Therefore, I repeat my estimations on a subsample of firms operating in industries that have values of Citations/Patent T ime above the mean. The coefficients on the BC indicator variable are negative and larger than those in the full sample, suggesting that the threat of hostile takeovers plays an even more important disciplining role for innovative firms. I also conduct the analysis on a subsample of firms operating in industries that have below-mean Citations/Patent T ime . Although the results are weaker, the coefficient on the BC dummy is still negative, supporting the moral hazard hypothesis.
Fifth, I check if economy-wide shocks caused the explanatory variables to affect innovation differently in different time periods. For example, larger firms, more profitable firms, older firms, or firms in more concentrated industries might respond in a different way to these shocks. If these differences are driving my results, I would expect the magnitude and significance of the coefficient on the BC dummy to diminish substantially, or disappear entirely. To control for this possibility, I separately interact log(Sales), EBI 
DT A Assets
, Age, and Leverage with time dummies. I find that the coefficients on the BC indicator variable are still statistically and economically significant, and slightly lower in magnitude than the coefficients in Tables III and IV . These results also alleviate concerns that the effects of Business Combination laws on innovation might be due to nonlinear time changing differences in size, or other firm characteristics of companies incorporated in Business Combination states compared to companies incorporated in non-Business Combination states.
Finally, since the NBER patent data set is primarily composed of firms that were publicly traded in 1989, I examine whether having more mature firms in later years in the sample introduces a survivorship bias. In principle, this can introduce a bias in the estimates if the mature firms present in the latter years innovate more and are incorporated in states that do not pass a Business Combination law. To allay these concerns, I follow the approach in Schoar (2002) and reestimate the relation between innovation and antitakeover laws for the 1981 to 1995 period. The results of this subperiod analysis reveal a similar negative relation between the number of citations per patent and antitakeover legislation.
III. Alternative Governance Mechanisms
In this section, I investigate the hypothesis that, after the antitakeover laws were enacted, firms that had stronger alternative governance mechanisms experienced a smaller decline in innovation than firms that had weaker mechanisms. Specifically, I examine the role of outside shareholder monitoring measured by the presence of large shareholders or pension funds, managerial career concerns measured by leverage, and product market competition. There are at least two potential problems with studying outside monitoring and leverage. First, they could be endogenous to innovation, because they are firm-specific choices unlike the antitakeover laws. Second, changes in leverage, large shareholders, and pension fund oversight may themselves be caused by changes in antitakeover laws. Indeed, as Table V demonstrates, Business Combination laws have a positive influence on leverage and pension fund ownership, and a negative influence on the presence of a large shareholder. Following Acharya and Subramanian (2009), I also include mean industry lagged citations per patent to measure the innovative potential of the firm. The results in Table V suggest that the presence of a large shareholder is positively related to the past innovative potential of the firm, while leverage and pension fund ownership are unrelated to it. Product market competition, however, measured by the Herfindahl index of industry concentration in column (4), or by the variable HITerciles, 10 is not related to Business Combination laws. Industry concentration is also less likely to be endogenous because it is outside the control of the individual firm.
To deal with the above two problems, I proceed in three ways. First, I examine mainly the interaction term between Business Combination laws and the R (4) (1) and (2), and 1976 to 2000 in columns (3) to (5). ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Large Shareholder Pension Fund Leverage Herfindahl HITerciles
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Ln (Sales (1) and (2)), or industry concentration (columns (3) and (4) (1) and (2), and 1976 to 2000 in columns (3) and (4). ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Tables VI and VII :
Ln(1+
where AltGov is either Large Shareholder85 (Table VI, columns (1) and (2)), Pension Fund85 (Table VI, columns (3) and (4)), Leverage85 (Table VII, columns (1) and (2)), or Industry Concentration (Table VII, columns (3) and (4)). Below, I analyze each of the alternative governance mechanisms in detail.
A. Large Shareholders
Shleifer and Vishny (1986, 1997) suggest that large shareholders (blockholders) have sufficient incentives to engage in costly monitoring of managers. Thus, they might improve corporate governance if the threat of hostile takeovers is absent and reduce the incentives of managers to shirk. To construct a measure that captures the presence of large shareholders, I follow Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) and create an indicator variable (Large Shareholder85) equal to one if there is a nonexecutive shareholder who owns more than 5% of equity, and zero otherwise. I obtain data from Thomson Financial Database (available through Wharton Research Data Services). This database starts in 1985 and therefore, as I explain above, I lose all firm-years before 1985 in the regressions that involve the presence of large shareholders. Fortunately, most of the antitakeover laws are enacted after 1985.
The results, reported in Table VI , columns (1) and (2), suggest that the presence of a blockholder reduces the negative effect of antitakeover laws on innovation. Column (2), for example, shows that the presence of a large shareholder mitigates the negative impact of the enactment of Business Combination laws on innovation by 85% 4 years after the law is passed. Presumably, a large blockholder makes it easier to fire a nonperforming CEO and thus provides top management with sufficient incentives to innovate in the absence of takeover threats. A case in point is the 2008 hostile takeover attempt of Yahoo, Inc. by Microsoft. Although the takeover attempt failed, the underperforming manager Jerry Yang was dismissed soon after that under the influence of Carl Ichan, who was a blockholder that had acquired a seat on Yahoo's board.
B. Public Pension Funds
The role of pension funds in promoting long-term investments and innovation is not well established. One strand of literature argues that institutional investors are believed to exacerbate incomplete contract and asymmetric information problems because they are agents of impatient individual investors who expect quick returns and hence are likely to dump a large volume of stock if current earnings decline, depressing the stock price and increasing the probability of a hostile takeover. Therefore, managers are likely to focus on short-term earnings and ignore long-term investments in R&D in the presence of an institutional investor (Stein (1988) ).
On the other hand, pension funds are more likely to engage in costly monitoring and disciplining of managers and mitigate the moral hazard problem. It is more difficult for large institutional investors to sell stock when they are not satisfied with management because the market might not be able to absorb large quantities of stock without a large price decline (Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach (1998), Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999) , Gillan and Starks (2000) ). Edmans (2009) also argues that, even if institutional blockholders are not actively trying to discipline managers, they are still beneficial to innovation: by trading on private information, institutional investors cause prices to reflect fundamental value rather than current earnings.
Despite the conflicting role of pension funds in corporate governance, they are considered one of the alternative governance mechanisms. In this paper, rather than examining the direct role of pension funds, I focus on whether they are able to substitute for the lack of takeover threats. I obtain data on institutional ownership from CDA/Spectrum Institutional (13f) holdings provided by Thomson Financial via Wharton Research Data Services. I identify public pension funds by using the match of pension fund names and manager numbers provided by Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) . The results are reported in Table VI , columns (3) and (4). They show that the presence of a pension fund mitigates the absence of takeover threats, and reduces the negative impact of Business Combination laws on innovation. The coefficient in column (4), for example, suggests that pension fund oversight decreases the negative effect of Business Combination laws by 94%.
C. Leverage
High leverage may reduce the negative impact of antitakeover legislation on innovation for at least two reasons. First, high leverage reduces free cash flow and increases the probability that the manager is fired for poor performance (Jensen (1986) ). Second, high leverage allows insiders to increase the proportion of their equity stake in the firm. As a result, their incentives will be more aligned with those of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling (1976) ). On the other hand, leverage reduces flexibility and increases financial constraints. As a result, I expect that the level of leverage will impact innovation negatively overall, but will also have a positive influence by mitigating the negative impact of antitakeover laws on innovation.
The results are reported in Table VII , columns (1) and (2). The coefficient on the interaction term of leverage with Business Combination laws is positive and significant in all specifications. These results suggest that high leverage reduces the negative impact of antitakeover legislation. The economic significance, however, should be interpreted carefully. Although the coefficient on the interaction term is positive and larger than the coefficient on the BC variable in all specifications, the positive effect of leverage dominates the negative antitakeover effect only if a firm's leverage increases from zero to one. A more appropriate interpretation is to examine by how much the negative impact of the antitakeover laws will be reduced by a one-standard-deviation increase in leverage: a one-standard-deviation (=0.23) increase in Leverage85 reduces the negative impact of Business Combination legislation by 41.9% (column (2) of Table VII ).
D. Product Market Competition
One of the basic findings of economic theory is that profit-maximizing firms operating in very competitive markets will earn zero economic profits in the long run. Under that scenario, there is no place for opportunistic managerial behavior if managers care about their careers and want their firms to stay in business. In contrast, firms that enjoy monopoly power can afford not to maximize economic profits and still earn positive profits, making it more likely for managers to enjoy private benefits. Giroud and Mueller (2010) empirically document that product market competition can act as a deterrent to opportunistic managerial behavior. They find that Business Combination laws have a negative impact on return on assets (ROA) only for firms in concentrated industries. Following their argument and methodology I test whether product market competition can mitigate the negative impact of Business Combination laws on innovation. Innovation has an advantage over ROA in that it can capture the long-term productivity of the firm.
I follow Giroud and Mueller (2010) and create three indicator variables to capture strength of product market competition: H I Low, H I Med, and H I High are equal to one if the firms are respectively in the first, second, and third tercile of the Herfindahl index, and zero otherwise. Higher levels of the Herfindahl index indicate higher industry concentration, and therefore weaker product market competition. I interact each of these variables with the indicator variable measuring the presence of Business Combination laws. The variables H I Low and BC * H I Low are the default indicator variables, and therefore are omitted from the regressions due to perfect multicollinearity.
The findings in Table VII , columns (3) and (4), are weaker than the results for the other alternative governance mechanisms. While Business Combination laws still have a strong negative impact on innovation, the interaction with industry concentration has an insignificant effect on innovation 3 years after the laws are enacted (column (3) of Table VII) , and a significant impact 4 years after the laws are enacted (column (4) of Table VII ). More specifically, firms that are in the second (third) tercile of industry concentration experience a 33.33% (44.44%) greater decline in citations per patent 4 years later than firms in the first tercile. This finding is similar to Giroud and Mueller (2010) , and weakly supports the view that product market competition can mitigate agency problems and discipline managers to innovate more.
12 However, unlike Giroud and Mueller (2010) , I find a negative (albeit smaller) impact of Business Combination laws on innovation even for firms in the first tercile of industry concentration. R
E. Antitakeover Legislation, Innovation, and Firm Value
To further assess the economic significance of the previous findings, I investigate how innovation, antitakeover laws, and alternative governance mechanisms interact to affect firm value. As discussed in Section IV, previous research finds that there is an immediate decline in firm value associated with announcements of antitakeover laws of about 0.5% on average (Easterbrook and Fischel (1991) ). For example, Karpoff and Malatesta (1989) find a negative stock price reaction to the announcement of Business Combination laws passed before 1987. The results in the previous literature are not directly comparable to the findings in Table VIII below for several reasons. First, the previous literature focuses predominantly on abnormal returns after the announcement of an antitakeover law, while I focus on the impact on the market-to-book ratio 1, 2, and 3 years later. Second, many of the previous studies look at a limited time period, or a limited number of states and laws, while I analyze the impact of all Business Combination laws for many years after the laws are passed to assess the long-term effects. Third, many of these studies do not identify the exact channel through which the decrease in takeover pressure affects firm value, which is the main focus of this paper: I argue that the decline in innovation partially contributes to the decline in firm value after the antitakeover laws are passed.
In Table VIII , I estimate the following regression model:
where Log(Q) is the logarithm of the market-to-book ratio of firm i incorporated in state s and located in state k at time t + n, where n is equal to one (in column (1)), two (in column (2)), or three (in column (3)). The results suggest that citations per patent increase firm value for up to 3 years after they are created.
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From column (3) of Table VIII , I find that one more citation per patent is associated with a 14.20% increase in the market-to-book ratio 3 years later. This result, combined with the findings in Table III that Business Combination laws decrease the number of citations per patent by 20.94% 4 years later, suggest that part of the decline in firm value is due to the decrease in the number of citations per patent. More specifically, a "back of the envelope" calculation suggests that there is a 2.92% reduction in firm value because of the decline in the number of citations per patent triggered by the enactment of Business Combination laws. 14 Table VIII also shows that the enactment of Business Combination laws independently leads to lower firm value, by 7.7% in the following year, by 7.2% 2 years later, and by 6.5% 3 years later. This finding is consistent with previous research that documents that the decrease in the threat of hostile takeovers reduces firm value. In the Internet Appendix, I examine not only the direct impact of Business Combination laws on firm value, but also their indirect influence through their interaction with citations per patent and alternative governance mechanisms such as leverage, the presence of large shareholders, and pension funds. The positive triple interaction term between citations per patent, BC, and alternative governance mechanisms shows that leverage, large shareholders, and pension funds mitigate the negative influence of Business Combination laws on firm value by the largest amount for highly innovative firms (with many citations per patent). R
IV. Related Literature
A. The Threat of Hostile Takeovers and Innovation
Earlier research provides inconclusive empirical evidence on the relation between hostile takeovers and innovation. Hall (1988) , for example, shows that hostile takeovers do not decrease R&D expenditures and innovation. There have been several conceptual, methodological, and measurement challenges to the interpretation of these findings. First, instead of measuring the threat of hostile takeovers, previous research studies the occurrence of actual takeovers. Doing so introduces a selection problem that can bias the results in the opposite direction because only a few firms are actually subject to a hostile takeover. By looking at the enactment of antitakeover laws, I examine the reduction in the threat of hostile takeovers for all firms incorporated in that state. Second, previous research focuses predominantly on a single governance mechanism. It is important to assess the interaction between the threat of hostile takeovers and alternative governance mechanisms.
Third, previous studies mostly document an association, rather than a causal link, between hostile takeovers and innovation. Examining an exogenous change in the threat of hostile takeovers is essential to properly evaluate the merits of hostile takeovers. A firm might become subject to a takeover because it is very innovative. In other words, results showing a positive relation between hostile takeovers and innovation may suffer from reverse causality because it is not hostile takeovers that drive innovation but higher innovation that makes the firm a more lucrative target. Using the passing of antitakeover laws as a measure of corporate governance has an important benefit in that it is largely an exogenous event to most U.S. corporations. In contrast, more direct firm-specific measures such as the use of poison pills, the structure of the board of directors, and the structure of stock ownership are determined endogenously by the firm, and thus obscure the true relation between corporate governance and innovation. Antitakeover laws and firm-specific antitakeover protection are not perfect substitutes, and therefore I document that the enactment of antitakeover laws has an independent effect even for firms that have adopted poison pills or other antitakeover protections.
Most extant studies measure innovation by R&D expenditures. In my analysis, I measure the quantity of innovation by the number of patents owned by a firm and the quality of innovation by the number of citations per patent (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2005) ). Furthermore, using patent citations allows me to assess the long-term merits of antitakeover laws, while previous research focuses predominantly on the short-term effects due to the noisiness of stock and accounting measures of performance that occurs far into the future.
In a more recent paper Sapra, Subramanian, and Subramanian (2012) theoretically argue and empirically document a nonlinear relation between antitakeover laws and innovation. Specifically, they develop a theoretical model that predicts a U-shape relation between antitakeover laws and innovation due to the interplay between takeover premia and private benefits of control. They empirically test that relationship by creating an index of antitakeover laws, and find that innovation is greater if the takeover threat is very high or very low, while innovation is smaller for intermediate levels of the takeover threat. The results are complementary to the current paper and indicate that too much pressure on management can be detrimental to innovation.
B. Antitakeover Laws and Corporate Behavior
Although the academic literature that analyzes the importance of antitakeover laws is extensive, 15 the impact of these laws on innovation has not been studied. One stream of research examines how the enactment of a specific antitakeover law affects the stock returns and shareholder wealth of companies incorporated in the legislating state (see, for example, Romano (1987) and Karpoff and Malatesta (1989) , among others). Some papers find a significant negative effect, while others find no effect. A survey by Easterbrook and Fischel (1991) reports that, on average, the value of the firms covered by the antitakeover laws falls by 0.5%.
Another increasingly popular stream of research looks at the impact of antitakeover laws on firm-specific characteristics other than stock performance. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) find that, after the passage of the laws, the level of CEO pay increases. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) show that antitakeover laws lead to an increase in workers' wages, to a decrease in new plant creation and old plant destruction, and to lower efficiency and profitability. Garvey and Hanka (1999) provide evidence that firms protected by antitakeover laws reduce their leverage ratios. Cheng, Nagar, and Rajan (2005) find that managers decrease their stockholdings in the post-legislation period because they can ensure their prior level of control while holding fewer risky shares. Giroud and Mueller (2010) find that Business Combination laws have a negative impact on ROA only for firms operating in noncompetitive industries-in the second and third terciles of the Herfindahl index of industry concentration.
Finally, a related literature examines the impact of different types of legislation on innovation. Acharya and Subramanian (2009) find that legal regimes that are more creditor friendly during bankruptcy are detrimental to innovation. Subramanian (2012a, 2012b) show that stringent labor laws around the world and wrongful discharge laws in the United States are beneficial for innovation because they prevent firms from punishing shortrun failures by dismissing employees, while encouraging ex ante risk taking to create novel products.
V. Conclusion
The enactment of antitakeover laws is shrouded in controversy and is vigorously contested. Advocates of antitakeover legislation argue that hostile takeovers force managers to invest mostly in short-term projects, diminishing the ability of U.S. corporations to innovate. Proponents of hostile takeovers R claim that the threat of takeovers prevents managers from shirking, and forces them to stay focused and innovate. Previous studies testing these theories are inconclusive.
I show that firms located in states that pass antitakeover laws have a smaller number of significant innovations, measured by citations per patent, after the law is passed than firms located in states that did not pass such laws. I also argue that, since citations per patent are associated with higher firm value, part of the decline in firm value after the enactment of Business Combination laws documented in previous studies may be due to the lower number of citations per patent for companies incorporated in antitakeover states relative to companies that are not. Finally, I demonstrate that alternative governance mechanisms, such as the presence of large shareholders, public pension funds, high leverage, and product market competition, can mitigate the negative impact of antitakeover laws on innovation. I find, however, that these governance mechanisms are imperfect substitutes, suggesting again that hostile takeovers are beneficial for innovation.
This paper provides at least three major contributions to the literature. First, it establishes a new channel through which the weakening of takeover pressure on management affects firm value. The findings in this paper show that hostile takeovers are beneficial even in the case of innovation, which requires heavy investment in human capital, a long-term focus, and tolerance to experimentation and mistakes (Holmstrom (1989) ). Second, this paper shows that alternative governance mechanisms can substitute, albeit imperfectly, for the lack of pressure from hostile takeovers. Third, this paper enhances our understanding of the ways in which capital markets and corporate governance can affect economic growth. The academic literature has already demonstrated that innovation is perhaps the strongest determinant of economic growth (see, for example, Solow (1957) and Romer (1987 Romer ( , 1990 ), and that capital market development also affects economic growth (Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000) , Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005) ). This paper goes beyond the previous findings to document that developed capital markets, by monitoring and disciplining top managers through the threat of hostile takeovers, can significantly affect innovation and thereby economic growth. ( CF Assets ) it : Cash flow of firm i in year t divided by its Assets (Source: Compustat).
Citations/Patent T ime it
: The number of citations per patent applied for in year t by firm i, divided by the total number of citations per patent received by all patents applied for in year t (Source: NBER Patent data set: Hall, Jaffee, and Trajtenberg (2001)).
Citations/Patent T ime−T ech it
: The number of citations per patent applied for in year t by firm i divided by the total number of citations per patent received by all patents applied for in year t in the same technological class (Source: NBER Patent data set: Hall, Jaffee, and Trajtenberg (2001)).
Citations/Patent
Quasi it : The number of citations per patent applied for in year t by firm i, where the number of citations of each patent in year t is multiplied by a weighting index created by econometrically estimating the distribution of the citation lag (the time from the application of the patent until a citation is received) (Source: NBER Patent data set: Hall, Jaffee, and Trajtenberg (2001) 
Appendix B: Construction of the Dependent Variable
B.1 The Truncation Bias in Patent Grants
The truncation bias in patent grants stems from the fact that there is an average lag of about 2 years between patent applications and patent grants. Thus, as one progresses toward the end of the sample, patents reported in the data set might underreport the actual patenting propensity of a firm-since many of the patents, though applied for, might not have been granted. Note that, although I use the application year as the relevant year for the analysis, the patents appear in the database only after they are granted. I follow Trajtenberg (2001, 2005) and correct for this bias by dividing the number of patents for each firm-year by the mean number of patents of all firms for that year.
B.2 The Truncation Bias in Patent Citations
The truncation bias in patent citations arises because patent citations are received many years after the innovation was created. I follow Trajtenberg (2001, 2005) and use two methods to correct for the truncation bias. The first method is called "fixed effects." It consists of scaling patent citations by the average number of patent citations in the same group (year, technology class, or year-and-technology class) to which the patent belongs. The advantage of the fixed effects approach is that I compare only patents that are in the same cohort and effectively purge the data from any effects due to truncation or other artificial differences in the propensity to receive citations among different groups. The drawback is that I also remove any real differences among the groups. Since the focus of this paper is not on estimating such differences, I am not very concerned about this drawback. Using the fixed effects method, I create two dependent variables. The first, Citations/Patent T ime , measures the number of citations per patent, where the number of citations received by a patent applied for in a given year is divided by the total number of citations received by all patents applied for in that same year. The second dependent variable, Citations/Patent T ime−T ech , is equal to the number of citations per patent in a given year by a given firm divided by the total number of citations received by all firms in the same year and in the same technological class. As mentioned above, the fixed effects method has its drawbacks. Therefore, for robustness I use a "quasi-structural" approach (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001) ), which econometrically estimates the distribution of the citation lag. The benefit of this approach is that it allows for real differences in the number of citations received in different time periods and technological classes. The drawback is that it requires two additional assumptions-the shape of the distribution over time is independent of the total number of citations received, and the lag distribution does not change over time. Using the estimated distribution lag, I create a weighting index and multiply the number of citations by this index. As one would expect, the index is higher for later years. The third dependent variable, Citations/Patent Quasi , is created by first multiplying the number of citations for each patent by the weighting index and then calculating the sum of the result for each firm per year and dividing by the number of patents for the same year.
